The Economic and Social Situation in the Community. Communication from the Commission to the European Council, Athens, 5-6 December 1983. COM (83) 722 final, 28 November 1983 by unknown
III.
II.
IV.
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY
(Communication from the Commission to the European Counci l
5-6 December 1983)
CONTENTS
The European economy: the outturn for 1983 and the outlook for 1984
The factors of uncertainty
The instabi lity of the international envi ronment
The revival of investment
The rei nforcement of the Communi ty ' s economi c structures
Economi~ policy guidelines
Domestic economic policies
The Community s contribution
Unemp loyment  particular considerationsThis Communication on the economic and social situation addresses the
questions raised by the European Council at its meeting in Stuttgart on the
extent of the upturn and the conditions for a lasting recovery of the
European economies, as wel l as increasing employment and productive
investment.
It follows on, in particular, from the Annual Economic Report 1983-84
which contains a detailed analysis of the economic situation and immediate
outlook, the structural difficulties sti II confronting the Community
and the conditions for consolidating the economic upturn. In addition
the European Counci l has received a number of communications on the
development of a range of new po l i ci esat Community level.
The first part of this Communication on the economic and social situation
examines the economic out turn for 1983 and the outlook for 1984. The second
part describes the factors of uncertai~ty affecting a lasting recovery,
and the third part presents proposals for bringing about such a recovery.
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY : THE OUTTURN FOR 1983 AND THE OUTLOOK FOR 1984
A. There are some signs of economic recovery in the Community, and this
should be confirmed in 1984; real growth, which was negative in 1981
(-0.4%), is expected to be +0. 5% in 1983 and
has three characteristics
+1. 5% in 1984. This recovery
- the upturn is slow and, for example, significantly weaker than in the
United States (+3. 5% in 1983; 4. 5% in 1984) and in Japan (+2. 8% in 1983;
+3.6% in 1984);
- it is unevenly distributed amongst the Member States; the average figure
for the Community is largely due to the performance of the economy in
Germany (+0. 7% in 1983 and +2. 1% in 1984) and in the United Kingdom
(+2.8% in 1983 and +2.2% in 1984); but in five Member States growth is
expected to be negative in 1983 and sti II weak in 1984;- 2 -
it is fragile in that it is due mainly to rising private ~onsumption,
stock repleni shment and a temporary increase in house-bui lding. Investment
and export demand wi II have contributed little in 1983; but in 1984
world imports could increase at a rate of some 3.5% in volume terms
(0. 1% in 1983) , which will help to underpin the recovery.
The rise in unemployment slowed down in 1983, and even leveLLed off
in the first half of the year. Two points must be made to qualify this
statement
- the initial levelling-off of unemployment towards the end of the fi rst
half of 1983 must be interpreted with caution; it is difficult to say
whether, after three unbroken years of sharply rising unemployment,
a change in trend has really occured in the Community. Uncertainties
remain as regards behaviour affecting the trend of activity rates and
the labour supply in general, and as regards the possible effect
of incipient economic recovery and spe~ific employment measures on the
demand for labour;
- both the level of unemployment (10~4% of the Labour force in 1983)
and the outLoo.k for 1984 (around 10.9%) confirm that, in spite of the
recovery which is beginning, the problem of unemployment remains serious
and, consequently, the objective of reversing the present trend and
then reducing the rate of unemployment must remain a central consideration
in the formulation of economic poli~ies.
Convergence in economi c performance has improved si gni fi cantLy :
1. inflation has fallen rapidly : after years of sharp rises in consumer
prices (11. 2% in 1980, 10. 1% in 1981 and 8.7% in 1982) , inflation should
be down to 6.3% in 1983 and is expected to faLL to 5.6% in 1984.- 3 -
These Communi ty averages mask increased convergence between national
rates of inflation : the spread in 1980 was from 5.5% (Germany) to more
than 20% (Italy and Greece) and wi II narrow in 1983 to a range of 3%
(Netherlands) to some 15% (Italy and Greece) and, in 1984 , to a range
of 3.5% (Germany) to some 11.5% (Italy), leaving aside Greece where
inflation will still be 18. 5%.
2. The Community s balance of payments on current account is gradually
moving back into equilibrium; following deficits of 1.3% of GDP in 1980
and 0.6% in 1981 and 1982 , equi l ibrium should be achieved in 1984
(deficit of 0. 3% in 1983).
Here too, the wide divergences between Member States in 1981 and 1982
should be reduced, mainly because of a significant improvement in the balance
of payments positions of BeLgium, Denmark, France and Italy.
3. Lastly, the average level of general government burrowing requirements,
while rem~ining high at around 5.4% of GDP in 1983, is tending to stabilize
and could indeed be reduced to some 4.7% of GDP in 1984. The publ i c debt
burden acr.ounts for a considerable proportion of the deficit : if net interest
payments were excluded, the deficit would account for only 0.6% of GDP in 1984.
II . THE FACTORS OF UNCERTPINTY
The prospects for a lasting recovery with satisfactory stability are
influenced by three factors, namely the international monetary and financial
situation, the revival of investment and the strengthening of the Community
economic structures.
A. !.h~ i.n~t2.bi.li.tx. ~f t.he i~t~r~a.!.i~n2.l e~vi.r~n~e~t
(1) The level of interest rates, in real terms, is sti l l too high, largely
as a result of the fiscal policy pursued by the United States. Quite
apart from the fact that it is not normal for the cost of money
to be so high during a period when activity is picking up again,
persistent high real interest rates are seriously handicapping the economies
of the developing countries , where the burden of the external debt
continues to stultify development potential. In addition, they could- 4 -
affect the recovery in the industrialized countries, where a fall in
interest rates is needed for the revival in investment that is crucial
to a return to lasting growth.
(2) Similarly, exchange rates continue to fluctuate widely, at levels
which do not reflect basic economic realities. This sort of situation
inevitably encourages purely speculative activities that absorb .
undue proportion of savings. It is also liable to provoke protectionist
reactions; it is therefore a factor of uncertainty hampering the recovery
in investment in the exporting s.ectors.
The sharp rise in the dollar during recent months has improved Europe
competitiveness vis-a-vis the United States; but since at the same time
the yen and the currencies of the other South-East Asian countries have
remained weak, the Community' s real gains have been rather limited.
(3) Lastly, the question of international indebtedness : stabi l ization
of the financial situation, accompanied by appropriate adjustment
policies, the reinforcement of the financial resources and of the supervisory
role of inter'national institutions
, .
and, above all, the strengthening of the
recovery in the industrialized countries are the main conditions for a
lasting solution to this problem.
B. The revi va l of investment
-------------
Only a revival of investment , and especially productive investment , can
sustain the recovery and gradually increase the potential rate of growth
of the European economies 1 , which has fallen from 4.7% per year over the
period 1969-73 to some 2% over the period 1975-83. At the same time,
investment as a proportion of GDP has fallen from 21% per year over the
period 1971-80 to less than 19% in 1983.
1 The potential rate of growth is defined as the rate of growth which can
be achieved assuming maximum use of productive capacity.- 5 -
!.h~, .!:.ei.n!o.!:.c~m~n.!. ~f t.he C~m~u~i'!'y~s e~o~o~i~ ~t.!:.u~t~r~s
The European economy has suffered a number of rude shocks over the last
ten years : oi l prices have tripled in six years; the labour force has
grown on average by 0.8% per year; the international monetary system
has been disrupted, whilst an immense international financial market has
grown up which has faci litated massive capital movements; and competition
from newly industrial ized countries has considerably increased.
Generally speaking, Europe has reacted effectively to the shocks which
have befaLLen the world economy. In the energy sector, for example, it
has made significant progress in uncoupling essential energy consumption
and GDP growth: the elasti~ity of energy consumption ~th respect to
GDP growth fell from 1 in 1973 to 0.65 in 1981.
However, Europe lags behind its principal competitors (notably the
United States and Japan) in certain fields which, by reason of their
technical and technological content , wiLL determine, in future, whether
or not Europe can maintain and increase its market share : an improved
performance in these fields would contribute, directly and indirectly,
to strengthening the productive base of European economies and to the
creation of viable employment.
For example, Communi ty exports of plant and ma~hinery over the period 1978-81
increased by only 5. 2% per year in real terms compared with an increase in
United States exports over  the  same period of 8.7% per year and in Japanese
exports of 11. 5% per year. The situation concerning the spread of new technolo-
gies is the same : at the end of 1982, for example, the number of robots
in use stood at 3 000 in Germany, 1 000 in the United Kingdom, 750 in France
and 600 in Italy, compared with 13 000 in Japan.
To sum up, although the European economy has begun a series of structural
adaptations , it is still faced with the dual imperative of modernization and
competitiveness, on which the solution of the employment problem largely
depends. It is therefore still of paramount importance to continue , and in
some fields step up, the process of adapting productive structures to the new
conditions governing international competition and demand. This medium term
action cannot be separated from that required to correct fondamental disequi-
libria (prices and balance of payments). Short-term economic policy and
structural poLicy must be mutually coherent : they interact with each other.- 6 -
III. ECONOMIC POLICY GUIDELINES
While economic developments in 1983 and the forecasts for 1984 firmly
indicate that the corner is being turned, they also show that recovery
so far is limited, patchy and hesitant.
The present upturn- the first since 1979 - must be consolidated asa first
stage in re-establishing lasting and stable growth. However, the room for
manoeuvre available to each Member State is limited and the influence of external
uncertainties is powerful : organizing and establishing the conditions for a
lasting recovery are, therefore, at least as important as the first signs of
an improvement , perhaps short-lived, in the economic situation.
The attainment of this objective will require both coherent national
economic policies and the full use of the Community framework.
~2~~~!if _~f2Q2~if_e21ifi ~~
Economic pol ides in 1984 should be such as to 
- reaffirm the priority given to reducing the rate of inflation;
establish the conditions for a progressive, lasting and stabLe revival
of activity, especiaLLy by the introduction of policies which stimulate
investment , in order to boost the confidence of producers , distributors and
consumers;
- be credible, which means that these policies must be applied with
determination; this implies, in particular, the establishement of realistic
objectives, careful timing, and, if necessa~y, flexibility in application;
- within this framework, the growth of incomes must be compatible with
the objective of restoring fundamental equi l ibrium and competitivity.- 7 -
1. In the budgetary field, the Member States have already initiated
difficult adjustments without waiting for recovery to begin : these efforts
must continue. At a time when the first successes are being won, priority
must , indeed, continue to be given to the drive to reduce defi~its and
steadi ly bring down the share of output accounted for by publ ic expenditure.
Thi s stance is necessary, both because of the economi c effects of
excessive deficits, on investment for example, and because of the high
level of national debt in most Member States. However, budgetary policy
should not be pursued without regard for the impact it may have on supply
and demand. Account must be taken of economi c deveLopments when pursuing
the clearobje~tive of reducing deficits; for example, those countries w~ch have
made large strides in their adjustment process (in terms of inflation and
external balance) and have modest public defi cits should not try to make
further inroads into those deficits too abruptly. Whatever the circumstances
in the event of a renewed deterioration in activity, the automatic stabilizers
should be allowed free play.
In the monetary field,external factors continue to exert a strong
influence. Experience shows , however, that a policy which gives priority
to an easing of real interest rates, albeit at the cost of increased
differentials in relation to rates obtaining on international markets,
is feasible: so important is the need for a fall in interest rates to
consol idate recovery that such a policy should be maintained provided
that there is a continued slowdown in inflation. This approach means
that monetary agregates should be managed accordingly and, at the same
time, that abrupt changes in monetary pol icy should be avoided.- 8 -
!h~_fQmm~Q i!l~ ~_fQQ!ri2~!iQQ
1. As the experience of the last few years has shown, the close coordination
of economic policies at Community level both overall policies and those
in specific fields like public finances - enhances their impact and
boosts confidence. The EMS has become an essential frame of reference for
the condu~t of economic policies at Community level. It assists the
processes of analysis, diagnosis and the agreed o~dering of priorities;
it is a di rect , fundamental force for convergence and for the economi 
cohesion of the Community. In addition, the EMS has the effect of strengthening
and ampl ifying the results of policies introduced in each Member State
by emphasising the linkages between these pol icies within the Community.
Strengthening the EMS would therefore be one means of making progress
towards monetary stability, greater economic discipline and more effective
policies.
On the international scene, exchange rate uncertainties , high interest rates
and the consequences for the financial situation of heavily indebted countries,
are sti II a very serious threat to the economic situation. International
monetary and financial relations must , therefore, be stabiLised. Recent
deveLopments like the undertaking by the United States and Japan on the rate
of the yen confi rm, as the Communi ty has urged on many occasions, that
national economies cannot cope with exchange rates that , for too long, are
utterly divorced from basic economic re;::litie:;. Mcmbf'r States must adopt,
particularly in the discussions following the Wi lliamsburg Summit, a tightly
co-ordinated position on the need to organize concerted international
action in the monetary field. It is most important that the Community should
be committed to arriving at common positions and, if possible, to putting
forward commonly agreed proposals in forthcoming discussions on such matters
as the role of  the  IMF, the problems of liquidity creation and distribution
and on exchange rates.- 9 -
2. The Community is an economic entity which, if used systematicaLLy,
could have a direct and positive impact on current economic difficulties
by providing a framework for joint initiatives designed to stimulate
investment , to accelerate the adjustment process in European economies
and to strengthen the competitive structures of Member States. The
Commission has sent the Counci L a series of proposals for exploiting the
Community s advantages , which discuss the foLLowing broad policy
guidelines
- bringing greater depth and substance to the single market in the broad
sense (i  e.  including standards) , in order to give companies better
conditions in which to develop at a higher level of productivity;
- a joint approach to the use and development of advanced technologies
and more coherent organization of the means deployed by Member States
should increase the effect of measures to adjust production structures;
::I new impetus to the process of bui lding an integrated financial market
commensurate with the overall savings resources in the Community, as a
::neans of har.,essing, at lower cost and with greater efficiency, increased
financial resources for the benefit of investment , especially in industry.
IV. UNEMPLOYMENT : PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS
Unemployment remains , the principal problem facing the Community.
Even the prospect of moderate recovery in 1984 offers no hope for a faLL in the
rate of unemp loymellt. In these ci rcumstances, speci f i c employment po l icy
measures are therefore still necessary. They must have a direct and
rapid effect on unemployment as the economy recovers.- 10 -
Vocational training programmes are a means, in particular, of attacking
structural unemployment by adjusting ski lls to technological change.
These programmes are of the greatest importance, especially for the
young unemployed, and priority must be given to their further expansion.
The expansion of programmes of local measures can help to create, on a
highly decentral ized basi s, new small businesses or new jobs in very small
industrial and service sector companies. Such programmes should be given
every encouragement, especially by the provision of advisory services
covering management, tax matters and relations with officialdom.
The reduction and adaptation of working time is sti II at the top of the
agenda in employment pol icy discussions, whi le all manner .of measures
affecting working time are being tried out. How far such measures
will help t.o create lasting jobs will depend directly on how they are
applied and especially on the extent to which they are accompanied by
increased flexibility in the use of equipment and on thE'ir sensitivity
to the requirement that companies remain competitive.
Amongst the different methods of reducing working time, early reti rement
schemes act directly on the number .of unempl.oyed. However, this type of
measure must take int.o account the possible effects on the social security
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(1) The figures shown in this table are taken from forecasts made in October. It is possible that growth in the United States
in 1984, wi II be greater than foreseen: the forecasts of current account balances (and, to a much lesser extent, of
growth) could therefore be generally better for the Community than the figures shown in the above tables.